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ARGUMENT
Appellant Golden Gardens Water Company (GGWC) responds to the new matters set
forth in the State's brief as follows:
1. The State's brief fails to cite a single relevant authority in support of its
argument that the Safe Drinking Water Board could conduct a hearing on the Executive
Secretary's Notice of Violation even though such a notice was exempt from the
Administrative Procedures Act under 63-46b-l(2¥k) and subject to judicial enforcement
under Section 19-4-107.

This is perhaps the most important threshold issue before the

Court, because if appellant GGWC prevails on this question, it is not necessary to reach the
broader issue of whether the Drinking Water Board lacks adjudicatory powers in general.
The State apparently does not dispute the clear exemption language of Section 6346b-l(2)(k), which is also recognized in the Board's rules (R. 309-101-9.1(b)). Rather the
argument in its brief (pp. 19-25) rests here, as it did in the District Court, on the claim that
the last phrase of Section 69-46b-l(2)(k) applies, which makes the Administrative
Procedures Act nonetheless applicable to "any agency action commenced by any person
authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of any such notice or order."
It is clear from the statute that in order for the exception that the State relies on to
apply, two mandated conditions must be present: (1) GGWC must have been "authorized
by law to contest the validity or correctness" of the notice of violation, which "law" under
Section 63-46b-3(3)(a) means the "law applicable to the agency"; and (2) GGWC must have
in fact "commenced" the Board's hearing in 1997 under Section 63-46b-3.
2

As to the first condition, we search in vain for any provision that authorized GGWC
to commence an administrative proceeding under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Safe
Drinking Water Act is silent, and the State's brief is silent.

There is no provision similar,

for example, to Section 19-2-111 of the Air Conservation Act. Moreover, such a provision,
if it did exist, would be in direct conflict with Section 19-4-107, which governs how a notice
of violation under the Safe Drinking Water Act is to be enforced.
The State's position rests exclusively on the unsupported claim that other Boards
within the Department of Environmental Quality are conducting hearings on notices of
violation, so the Safe Drinking Water Board should be able to do likewise.
There are no facts before the Court about what other Boards may or may not be doing
with regard to conducting hearings on notices of violation, other than the few cases cited by
the State in its brief. These opinions, discussed below, involve exclusively either the Air
Quality Board or the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, two Boards which the
State's brief acknowledges (Aplee's Brief, p. 20-21) are specifically authorized by statute
to conduct administrative hearings under provisions which have no counterpart in the Safe
Drinking Water Act.
The State's brief (p.22) tries to draw an analogy between the Safe Drinking Water Act
and the Underground Storage Tank Act, claiming they both lack provisions empowering the
respective Boards to conduct hearings, yet the latter Board conducts administrative hearings.
This compares apples to oranges in that the Underground Storage Tank Act is one of several
enactments in Title 19 Chapter 6 under the regulatory control of the Solid and Hazardous
3

Waste Control Board. As noted above, this Board has express authority to conduct
administrative hearings. The Underground Storage Tank Act sets out further responsibilities
of that Board, which we concede do not reiterate the adjudicatory powers 01 max uoara
contained in earlier parts. It would however seem implied that the duties and powers of that
Board in the Underground Storage Tank Act are cumulative with its other powers. However,
we are not here trying to defend the adjudicatory powers of that Board, which apparently
have never been reviewed by any court. Perhaps it has been holding hearings illegally under
the Underground Storage Tank Act. The point is that the State's analogy has no compelling
logic.
The State's cases moreover are all easily distinguishable. In V-1 Oil v. Dept. of
Environ. Quality. 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997), an owner of an underground petroleum tank
was issued a notice of violation for an alleged release of gasolinefromthe tank. The owner
filed a written request for agency action to the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board,
which has promulgated extensive rules with regard to conducting administrative hearings
which have no counterpart in the rules of the Drinking Water Board. While we have a
problem with the validity of some of those rules, no issue was presented to the Court in this
case about the power of that Board to conduct an administrative hearing, nor does the case
address any issue concerning whether the violator was authorized by law to commence the
agency action under the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Act. The only issue on appeal
was the propriety of the hearing examiner appointed by the Board. The other two V-1 Oil
cases cited are reviews of administrative hearings commenced by V-1 before the Solid and
4

Hazardous Waste Control Board. Neither case discusses whether V-1 was authorized by law
to commence the administrative proceedings. Thus, these cases deal not only with an agency
possessing express powers to conduct administrative hearings, but they also contain no
holdings that support the State's argument on the issue here.
Other cases relied on by the State are even more extraneous. Magcorp. of America
v. Air Quality Bd.> 941 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1997) is an appeal from an administrative
determination of the Air Quality Board. There is no discussion of who commenced the
hearing, let alone any holding whether Magcorp. was authorized by law to do so, if it in fact
did. Similar is LaSal Oil v. Dept. of Env. Quality. 843 P2d. 1045 (Utah App. 1992), another
case involving the Solid and Hazardous Waste Board. Finally, Sierra Club v. Utah Waste
Control Board 964 P.2d 335 (Utah App. 1998), did not even involve a notice of violation.
The Sierra Club commenced agency action before the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control
Board to challenge a permit granted to the Army to incinerate chemical weapons at the
Tooele Army Depot. There is no issue addressed about the statutory authority of the Sierra
Club to initiate the proceeding or the statutory authority of that Board to adjudicate the
petition.
With regard to whether GGWC commenced agency action, GGWC's short letter
requesting a hearing (Appendix A) cannot in any sense be construed as a petition under the
Administrative Procedures Act. By all appearances the action had already been initiated by
the State. None of the formalities outlined in Section 63-46b-3 were complied with by either
GGWC or the State. GGWC simply asked for a hearing because its president was instructed
5

falsely that asking for a hearing was the only way GGWC could challenge the Executive
Secretary's Notice ofViolation (Appendix B). An honest representation of GGWC s options
would have pointed out that if GGWC did not comply with the Order, the Executive
Secretary would be obliged to seek enforcement in court. Nowhere in the State5 s Brief is this
misrepresentation of the law by the Executive Secretary denied or defended. The Attorney
General simply asserts that there was no "vast conspiracy", apparently trying to discredit a
serious issue by giving it a pejorative label. We suggested no vast conspiracy, only that the
Executive Secretary falsely represented the law to GGWC, and that he apparently did so
deliberately in an effort to con GGWC into requesting a hearing so that the request could be
used as a basis for skirting around the Section 63-46b-l(2)(k) exemption.
To conclude, we assert that no hearing was or could have been conducted under the
exception contained in Section 63-46b-l(2)(k). The only avenue open to the Executive
Secretary and the Board to enforce the Executive Secretary's Notice of Violation was an
action in court under Section 19-4-107.
2. The State's brief advances no reasonable interpretation of the Safe Drinking
Water Act or the Environmental Quality Code that the Drinking Water Board has been
generally empowered to conduct adjudicative hearings. The State's discussion of this
issue contains certain illogical assertions that need to be cleared away at the outset because
they having nothing to do with proper statutory construction and confuse the applicable
standards ofjudicial review.

6

The State cites Professional Staff Management Inc. v. Dept of Employment Security.
953 P.2d 76 (Utah App. 1998) and Sierra Club, supra, for the proposition that the courts give
administrative agencies deference in reviewing their application of law to a particular state
of facts. We take no issue with this statement of the standard of review of certain
administrative determinations, but the relevance of these cases to this one totally escapes us.
The case here is not on appealfroman administrative determination, nor do reviewing courts
give any deference to either lower courts or administrative agencies in interpreting statutes.
See Sierra Club, supra, at 964 P.2d 344 ( "We review the agency's statutory construction
as a question of law under a correction-of-error standard unless the statute expressly or
impliedly grants the agency discretion to interpret the statutory language.")
The question of whether the legislature has authorized the Drinking Water Board to
conduct adjudicatory hearings is purely a question of law that has nothing whatever to do
with the Board's expertise, and the State has not taken issue with appellant's statement of
the standard of review applicable here. Moreover, the underlying questions at the heart of
this case, as discussed in Point HI of appellant's initial brief, are principally legal issues and
no more difficult than courts deal with on a regular basis without the assistance of an
administrative agency.
The State's argument is puzzling also as to whether it is claiming that the statutory
language in question is ambiguous or plainly clear. Its brief seems to be asserting that the
legislative intent is "clear"fromthe "plain language." (Aplee's Brief 16-17). Yet the State
argues the legislative history and cites to cases such a Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497
7

(Utah App. 1999), which deals with the standard of review of an ambiguous statute.1
There is no need to resort to rules of construction or legislative history if the
legislature's intent is evident from the plain language of the statute. The Utah Supreme
Court has summarized the law with respect to this in V-l Oil Co. V. Utah State Tax Comm^
323 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997):
Here, as in other cases, "when faced with a question of statutory construction,
we look first to the plain language of the statute." CIG Exploration, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 897 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah 1995), cert, denied, 516
U.S. 1042, 133 L. Ed. 2d 656, 116 S. Ct. 699 (1996). Under our rules of
statutory construction, we need not look beyond the plain language of this
provision unless we find some ambiguity in it, Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc.,814P.2dll08,1112 (Utah 1991). In analyzing a statute's plain language,
we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent
meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms. Id. If we find the provision
ambiguous, however, we then seek guidance from the legislative history and
relevant policy considerations. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper
Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). In addition, -if doubt or
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, the
court should analyze the act in its entirety and Tiarmonize its provisions in
accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.fH Beynon v. St.
George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah) (quoting Osuala v.
Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242,243 (Utah 1980)), cert, denied, 510 U.S.
869, 114 S. Ct. 195, 126 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1993).

Or as succinctly put recently by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals: "When legislative
intent is plain from the language used, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory
construction."

Grant v. Grant 964 P.2d 963 (Okla.Civ.App.Div. 1 1998).

1

The quotationfromthe Sulzen case contained in the State's brief actually is derived
from the headnote and not the court's opinion. Omitted is the important qualifying phrase,
"When a statute is ambiguous".
8

We submit the legislative intent of the Environmental Quality Code is plain and that
the construction urged by the State is unreasonable. The State concedes that the Safe
Drinking Water Act itself "does not expressly address administrative hearings". (Aplee's
Brief, p. 16). Hence the sole question presented by die State's argument is whether the
general provisions of the Environmental Quality Code—Title 19, Chapter 1—nonetheless
bestow powers upon the Drinking Water Board not contained in the Safe Drinking Water
Act. The State relies on three sections: 19-1-301,19-1-106(2), and 19-1-305, the latter two
of which were not addressed in appellant's initial brief. None of these sections grants
express powers to any Board within the Department. In fact Section 19-1-106(2), which the
State curiously maintains favors its position, expressly limits the "authority of the boards"
to "the specific authority granted to them under this title," which are exclusively enumerated
in each separate act within Title 19 as part of the establishment of each Board. The only
express powers and duties outlined in the general provisions of Title 19 are those of the
Department of Environmental Quality itself.
Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of Section 19-1-301, especially read in
harmony with Section 19-1-106(2), is that the boards within the department are to comply
with the administrative procedures act to the extent they conduct adjudicative hearings.
Since the Drinking Water Board has not been authorized to conduct hearings, this provision
is superfluous, but certainly not in conflict with any provision of the Safe Drinking Water
Act. To say that Section 19-1-301 empowers the Drinking Water Board to conduct
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administrative hearings is to read into the statute something that is not there and which would
be inconsistent with both Section 19-1-106(2) and Section 19-4-107.
Similarly, Section 19-1-305 deals with extending the statute of limitations for bringing
an action to assess fines resulting from administrative orders of various departments. We
concede this section does not carefully draw asfinea distinction between the types of notices
mentioned as it perhaps should. But no reasonable construction of this statute would hold
that it purports to empower the Safe Drinking Water Board to conduct adjudicative
proceedings if it otherwise lacks such powers.
Finally, the State argues (Aplee's Brief pp. 12-13) that the repeal oi section zo-iz-y
of the Safe Drinking Water Act, which formerly authorized the Drinking Water Board to
conduct adjudicative proceedings, was not intended to withdraw such powersfromthe Board
because the repeal was part of the enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act This
argument may be considered only to the extent the Court decides that the statutes currently
in effect cannot be construed based on their plain language. The simple answer to this claim
is that hearing powers were preserved by the legislature for other Boards in what was then
the Health Department as part of the administrative code amendments. The legislature thus
could easily have done the same for the Drinking Water Board if it had intended to do so.
The extensive revisions in the Administrative Procedures Act required to preserve hearing
powers of other Boards are simply absentfromthe Safe Drinking Water Act amendments,
where the legislature repealed that Board's hearing powers altogether. The striking contrast
between how the legislature addressed the Drinking Water Act compared to some of the
10

other environmental enactments is evident in the Administrative Procedures Act itself, S. B.
No. 35, Chapter 161 Laws of Utah 1987.
3. The representations in the State's brief concerning the underlying merits of
the case are both inappropriate and incorrect. Appellee's Brief (p. 4) makes certain
representations about GGWC s compliance with peak flow requirements besides the question
of fire flows addressed in Point HI of appellant's brief. These issues are not appropriately
here, but we contest the representations of the State in order that no prejudice attaches by
reason of those claims. The peak flow requirement of GGWC's system with its 24 customers
for indoor water use is easily computed with any calculator with exponent functions from
the simple equation Q=10.8 N 064 set forth R309-105-1 of the Board's rules (Appellant's
Brief Addendum B), where Q is the total flow in gallons per minute, and N is the number of
residential customers. That calculates to 83 gallons per minute. The State measured the
pump output of just one of the two pumps of GGWC's system in 1991 at 109 gallons per
minute, with a pressure of 45 psi, and estimated that with both pumps operating, the system
could produce a flow of 321 gallons per minute. (See R. 262,265). The alleged measured
flow rate of 88 gallons per minute mentioned in the State's brief is an unsupported allegation
contained in an affidavit submitted to the District Court which is at odds with other
measurements reported in the record.
The State also insists that irrigation requirements must be included in the calculations
even though GGWC is not required to provide irrigation service and does so for a few
customers only out of natural artesian overflow to a separate irrigation line on an "as, when,
11

an if available" basis. This service has no impact on the operating characteristics of the
indoor system. The Board's rale with regard to irrigation is a "system planning" rule similar
to fire flow regulations that takes into account irrigation flows if a system "must" provide
irrigation. (R309-105-2, Appellant's Brief Addendum B). This is just another instance of
an overbearing and unreasonable application of rules on which the bureaucrats will never
budge, justifying court intervention.

Yet, we believe the evidence at trial will show that

GGWC meets these standards, even if not required to do so.
4. The argument in Point II of the State's brief begs the question and is
unsupported by any cited authority. In arguing that the water company had to raise its
challenge to the agency's rules as part of the administrative hearing, the power of the
Drinking Water Board to conduct adjudicative hearings is assumed while that is the very
question before the Court. Moreover, even if this Court determined that the Drinking Water
Board has the power to conduct adjudicative hearings, the exceptionfromthe requirements
of the Administrative Procedures Act of challenges to an agency's rules in Section 63-46bl(3)(b) clearly removes such challenges from the jurisdiction of the administrative agency,
which promulgated the rule in the first place and is unlikely to strike down its own rule.
Although the provisions in question have apparently not been construed in any Utah
case, the Administrative Procedures Act is clear. It neither precludes a challenge in court of
an agency's rules if such a legal remedy otherwise exists (Section 63-46b-l(3)(b)), nor does
it govern judicial review of an agency's rules (Section 63-46b-l(2)(a)). There is simply
nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act that mandates an administrative hearing to
12

challenge an agency's rule, and the State cites no case that holds that a challenge to an
agency's rules must be presented to the agency for adjudication before it can be challenged
in Court.
The State misrepresents the holding in Salt Lake County v. CarlstoiL 776 P.2d 653,
(Aplee's Brief, p. 25) by using bracketed language in a quote from that case to make it
appear that it addresses administrative hearings. In fact the case was an appeal of a
negligence action in which the appellant attempted to raise an issue on appeal regarding jury
selection where no objection had been made at trial. Neither an administrative hearing nor
the Administrative Procedures Act was involved.
Whitear v. Labor Common 973 P.2d 982, (Applee's Brief, p. 27) is distinguishable
because it does not involve a challenge to the agency's rules.
GGWC's challenge to the Drinking Water Board's rule was asserted in its pleadings,
and there has been no other opportunity to have the issue heard by the District Court, since
the matters before the District Court are in the pretrial stage. The discussion in the State's
brief (Aplee's Brief, pp. 25-26) about what constitutes timely submission of an issue to the
lower tribunal is thus completely inapposite and puzzling.
Concerning fines, we were not aware that by filing its Motion for Order to Show
Cause that the State was waiving its claim for penalties, as its Brief seems to assert.2 The

2

The claim in the State's brief that "division has not asserted willful violation of
the rules" is incorrect, since the State sought a penalty of up to $10,000 per day of
violation, the penalty for willful violation. See the State's Amended Complain, R. 104.
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motion surely does not so state. If the State's brief is a concession on this point, we
gratefully accept it.
5. The State's brief refuses to discuss the merits of the fundamental issue raised
in Point i n of appellant's initial brief on the inappropriate pretense that it was never
adjudicated by the Drinking Water Board. The issue of the correct interpretation and
applicability of the Drinking Water Board's peak flow regulations concerningfireflows was
not raised as a matter that this court must review, but rather as a legal question that likely
would surface if this case is remanded for trial. It is therefore appropriate to present the issue
on this appeal for possible guidance if this Court chooses to address it, which is how the
issue was cast in GGWC's initial brief. See State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781,786 (Utah 1992)
and cases cited therein.
The State's brief simply dodges the issue, solely on the basis that the matter should
have been raised as part of the administrative hearing. This argument of course begs the
question again in addition to missing the point. Appellant's argument in Point HI of its initial
brief thus stands uncontested.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of March, 2001.
RANDLE, DEAMER, MCCONKIE
& LEE, P.C.

Stephen R. Randle
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM A

November 18,1996

Jig

ft;'

Kevin W. Brown, Executive Secretary
Drinking Water Board
Department of Environmental Quality
Division of Drinking Water
150 N 1950 West
P.O. Box 144830
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4830
Dear Mr. Brown:
Subject: Notice of Violation and Order
Golden Garden Water Co. (#23001)
We would like to request a hearing to address the various requirements noted in
the above order.
If this request meets with your approval, we would appreciate information as to
when we could meet with the Board.
Sincerely,

y£4, L&t
Tage M. Nyman
Golden Garden Water Company

c

cc: Tooele County Health Dept.
Enclosures

20

00

ADDENDUM B

Utah Drinking Water Board
In the Matter of:

Notice of Violation and Order:

Golden Gardens Water System

Case No. 9701001

The Utah Drinking Water Board (hereinafter "Board") issues this Notice of Violation and Order
("Notice and Order") to the Golden Gardens Water System in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
19-4-101 et seq. and the State Drinking Water Act (hereinafter "Act"), specifically incorporating
§ § 19-4-104, 106, 107, and 109. This Notice and Order is issued in accordance with the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated §63-46b et. seq.
Facts and Violations
1.

Tage Nyman, owns and operates a culinary water system, known as the Golden Gardens
Water System ("Golden Gardens"), in Tooele County Utah.

2.

Golden Gardens has violated Section R309-104-4.3 and R309-104-5 of the Utah
Administrative Code ("UCA") by failing to monitor for Pesticides and Unregulated
Organic Chemicals.

3.

Golden Gardens has violated Section R309-105-1 UCA by failing to meet peak
instantaneous flow requirements.

4.

Golden Gardens has violated Section R309-102-5 UCA by failing to meet the
requirements of a cross-connection control program.
ORDER

The Golden Gardens Water System is hereby ordered to:
5.

Collect Pesticides and Unregulated Organic samples from well No. 1 and submit the
sample results to the Executive Secretary within 15 days of receipt of this Notice and
Order.

6.

Submit a cross-connection control program that includes: a) an operating plan or by-laws
covering procedures for dealing with cross connections, b) an inventory of existing and
potential cross connection sites, c) a procedure for maintaining records on an on-going
enforcement, and d) a commitment to attend operator training on cross-connection control
to the Executive Secretary within 30 days of receipt of this Notice and Order.

7.

Submit a plan of action and time schedule outlining how the system will be able to
provide sufficient water to meet peak instantaneous flow requirements to the Executive
Secretary within 30 days of receipt of this Notice and Order. At a minimum the plan will:
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8.

A)

identify which option will be pursued [i.e.: (a) hydropneumatic
tanks, (b) elevated storage, or (c) increasing source capacity etc.],

B)

identify when plans will be submitted to the Division of Drinking
Water for review. (Plans should be submitted at least within 60
days.), and,

C)

include a commitment to complete construction of the selected
alternative and have it operational within 270 days of receipt of
this Notice and Order.

Provide a notice to customers informing them of the past violations and the plan
to correct the deficiencies within 30 days of receipt of this notice. This notice
must follow the outline as provided in attachment A.

NOTICE:

Any further administrative proceedings in this case shall be conducted formally,
under Utah Code Annotated § § 63-46b-6 through 63-46-14, inclusive; and R309101-9.1(b), Utah Administrative Code. To contest this Notice of Violation and
Order, you must respond to it in writing and request a hearing from the Board.
The response and request for hearing must be received by the Executive Secretary
(at the address given below) within 30 days of the date of receipt of this notice
and order. See Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-3(2)(a)(vi) and § 63-46b-12. You
will not be allowed to contest this Notice of Violation and Order in court if you do
not first participate in the hearing process described in the Utah Code Annotated §
63-46b-14(2).
Under Utah Code Annotated § 19-4-109, one who violates the Act or a related
permit, rule, or order may be subject to a civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 per day of
violation. Willful violators may be fined or penalized up to $5,000 a day.

Date this

TlX^

day of

Ot^ooejr

, 1996.

DRINKING WATER BOARD

Bv: T ^ ^ C ^ ^ ^ —
Kevin W. Brown
Executive Secretary
P.O. Box 144830
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4830
536-4208
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on October.
1996,1 caused to be mailed by certified mail a
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER, to:

Tage John Nyman
Golden Gardens Water System
406 Creekside Circle #F
Murray, Utah 84028

~~p<£^-*st -?y>r
Kevin W. Brown
Executive Secretary

Fred Nelson
M. M. Hubbell
Assistant Attorney General
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

